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THE DURATION OF TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDERS IN FEDERAL COURT
Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
a temporary restraining order may issuefor ten days and extend
for an additional ten days #'good cause is shown. Most federal
courts have held that if a TRO extends beyond twenty days
without the consent of the restrained party, the TRO is trans-
formed into a preliminary in/unction. However, since the TRO
transformed into an injunction fails to satisfy the requirements
of a preliminary injunction, the courts strike it as being improp-
erly issued This comment examines this phenomenon, analyzes
the conflicting positions among the circuit courts, and suggests
that in certain circumstances TROs that extend beyond twenty
days should remain TROs and not be transformed into invalid
preliminary injunctions.
I. INTRODUCTION
An injunction is defined as a judicial order which requires a per-
son to refrain from doing a certain act.' A temporary restraining order
(TRO), a type of injunction,2 is considered an extraordinary remedy3
issued only in exceptional or urgent situations.4 TROs are designed to
maintain the status quo and prevent unnecessary and irreparable in-
jury5 until a preliminary injunction hearing can be held.6 TROs are
distinguishable from other injunctions in that they are of short dura-
tion,7 may be issued ex parte without notice to the adverse party,8 and
are not appealable.9
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure impose strict limitations
upon the availability and duration of TROs in federal court.'" Rule 65
(b) provides, in part, that a TRO must expire within ten days of its
issuance unless the order is extended for another ten days upon a show-
ing of good cause or the restrained party consents to a further exten-
sion." Generally, this twenty day maximum duration is strictly
1. United Bonding Ins. Co. v. Stem, 410 F.2d 483, 486 (3d Cir. 1969).
2. Owens v. Coker, 368 S.W.2d 777, 778 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
3. Norwalk Core v. Norwalk Bd. of Ed., 298 F. Supp. 203, 206 (D. Conn. 1968),
affid, 423 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1970).
4. Luster Enter., Inc. v. Jacobs, 278 F. Supp. 73, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
5. Major v. Sowers, 297 F. Supp. 664, 666 (E.D. La. 1969).
6. Norwalk Core v. Norwalk Bd. of Ed., 298 F. Supp. 203, 206 (D. Conn. 1968),
affid, 423 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1970).
7. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Flight Eng'rs Int'l Ass'n, 306 F.2d 840, 843 (2d
Cir. 1962).
8. Carroll v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 180 (1968).
9. Grant v. United States, 282 F.2d 165, 167 (2d Cir. 1960).
10. See FED. R. CIv. P. 65(b).
11. Id I refer to the durational limitation upon TROs as twenty days throughout this
article. Of course, I am referring to the ten days authorized by rule 65(b) as well
as the authorized ten day extension.
19831 Temporary Restraining Orders
interpreted and rigidly applied by the federal circuit courts.12 Most cir-
cuit courts find that extending a TRO beyond twenty days results in its
transformation into a preliminary injunction. 13 The consequences of
this transformation are significant for two reasons. First, a preliminary
injunction is an appealable order that may be reviewed by an appellate
court, while a TRO is generally not appealable.1" Second, the require-
ments that must be satisfied for a TRO to issue fail to satisfy the mini-
mum requirements of a preliminary injunction.' 5 Thus, when a TRO
extending beyond twenty days is appealed as a preliminary injunction,
the appellate court will often strike it as being improperly issued. How-
ever, other circuits hold differently and find that in certain circum-
stances a TRO extending beyond twenty days is not transformed into a
preliminary injunction.
This comment discusses the time limitations placed upon TROs in
federal court,' 6 including the relevant statutory history of rule 65. It
also examines the conflicts among the circuits that have not been re-
solved by the Supreme Court. Finally, it is suggested that in certain
narrowly defined circumstances a federal district court should have the
authority to extend a TRO beyond twenty days without it becoming an
invalid preliminary injunction.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Judiciary Act of 1872
The Judiciary Act of 187217 was the first statute in the United
12. Eg., Sims v. Greene, 160 F.2d 512, 516 (3d Cir. 1947).
13. E.g., Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Flight Eng'rs Int'l Ass'n, 306 F.2d 840, 843
(2d Cir. 1962); Sims v. Greene, 160 F.2d 512, 516-17 (3d Cir. 1947).
14. See Grant v. United States, 282 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1960). There are, however,
certain circumstances when refusal to grant a TRO effectively disposes of the ac-
tion for injunctive relief. In such circumstances an order of refusal has been held
to be appealable as a final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976), because it comes
within the collateral order doctrine enunciated in United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d
772, 778 (4th Cir. 1961), cert denied, 369 U.S. 850 (1962).
15. A court shall set forth separate findings of fact and conclusions of law which con-
stitute the grounds of its actions when refusing or granting a preliminary injunc-
tion. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). In addition, a preliminary injunction may issue only
after a hearing during which both parties to the dispute have had an opportunity
to be heard. Morning Telegraph v. Powers, 450 F.2d 97, 99 (2d Cir. 1971), cert
denied, 405 U.S. 954 (1972). A TRO, on the other hand, may be issued without
notice when it appears that there is a possibility of immediate and irreparable loss,
injury or damage occurring before notice can be served and a hearing held on a
motion for a preliminary injunction. Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 88 n.59
(1974).
16. This comment does not deal with injunctions in any depth or detail. For a com-
plete and detailed treatment of injunctions, see Note, Developments in the Law--
Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994 (1965).
17. Judiciary Act of 1872, ch. 255, § 7, 17 Stat. 196, 197 (recodified as ch. 12, § 78,
Rev. Stat. 136 (1878)). Prior to its enactment in 1872, the Act of Congress of
March 3, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 334, 335 (1793) was the statutory authority for
issuing injunctions. Section 5 provided: "nor shall a writ of injunction be granted
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States to specifically authorize federal courts to issue TROs.18 In
Houghton v. Meyer, '9 the Supreme Court expressly stated that a federal
court has the power to grant a TRO when it appears that the delay
caused by waiting for a preliminary injunction hearing presents a dan-
ger of irreparable injury.2" Although the Judiciary Act of 1872 placed
no definite time limitation upon the duration of a TRO, the Supreme
Court was aware that it could not be allowed to extend indefinitely2'
and held that a TRO, if granted, should remain in effect only until such
time as a decision upon the motion for a preliminary injunction could
be made.22
By requiring the party seeking a TRO to simultaneously file a mo-
tion for a temporary injunction, and limiting the duration of a TRO to
the time required for completion of the injunction hearing, the Court's
interpretation of the statute seems to strike a balance between two con-
flicting interests. Houghton protects a restrained party from indefi-
nitely being denied an opportunity to be heard,23 yet at the same time
recognizes that a person facing irreparable harm or injury, if forced to
await a judicial decision on an injunction, should be able to obtain
some type of judicial relief.
A survey of the case law from 1872 to 1914 reveals that very few
cases dealing with TROs were litigated. Of the few decisions rendered,
it was apparently believed that a TRO was limited to the time it took to
render a decision on the motion for a temporary injunction.2 4 In 1914,
however, Congress departed from this position.
in any case without reasonable previous notice to the adverse party, or his attor-
ney, of the time and place of moving the same." Section 5 was interpreted by the
courts so as to preclude TROs. See Houghton v. Meyer, 208 U.S. 149, 155-56
(1908).
18. Houghton v. Meyer, 208 U.S. 149, 155 (1908).
19. 208 U.S. 149 (1908). In this case, which was the Supreme Court's first detailed
analysis of the Judiciary Act of 1872, a TRO was issued by a district court re-
straining the Postmaster General from refusing to transmit certain of the appel-
lant's publications at second class postal rates.
20. Id. at 156.
21. To allow a TRO to extend for an indefinite time would be a violation of the
restrained p arty's right to due process. As a TRO is a species of injunction issued
without a hearing or an opportunity for both sides to be heard, if no limit on its
duration exists, then the TRO ceases to be temporary and is not distinguishable
from other injunctions. However, an injunction may not properly issue until a
hearing has been held during which both sides have an opportunity to be heard.
Therefore, an injunction issued without a hearing or an opportunity to be heard
violates the enjoined party's due process. See id at 155-56.
22. Id at 156. "[A) judge may grant a restraining order in case it appears to him there
is a danger of irreparable injury, to be in force 'until the decision upon the mo-
tion' for temporary injunction." Id
23. See supra note 22.
24. See, e.g., North Am. Land and Timber Co. v. Watkins, 109 F. 101, 106 (5th Cir.
1901); Worth Mfg. Co. v. Bingham, 116 F. 785, 789 (5th Cir. 1901); Yuengling v.
Johnson, 30 F. Cas. 896 (E.D. Va. 1877) (No. 18,195).
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B. The Clayton Act of 1914
In 1914 Congress passed the Clayton Act.25 Section 17 of that Act,
the progenitor of rule 65(b), dealt primarily with TROs.2 6 The provi-
sions of Section 17 differed markedly from those of the Judiciary Act of
1872. The most significant change effected was the imposition of a
twenty day maximum duration for TROs.21 Section 17 also required
that when a TRO was issued without any notice to the party being
restrained, a hearing on whether a preliminary injunction should be
granted had to be scheduled at the earliest possible time.28
It is difficult to discern why a more definite time limitation was
placed upon the duration of TROs by the Clayton Act.29 It would ap-
25. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 17, 38 Stat. 737 (1914) (current version at FED. R. Civ. P.
65(b)).
26. Section 17 provided as follows:
That no preliminary injunction shall be issued without notice to the op-
posite party.
No temporary restraining order shall be granted without notice to
the opposite party unless it shall clearly appear from specific facts shown
by affidavit or by the verified bill that immediate and irreparable injury,
loss, or damage will result to the applicant before notice can be served
and a hearing had thereon. Every such temporary restraining order
shall be endorsed with the date and hour of issuance, shall be forthwith
filed in the clerk's office and entered of record, shall define the injury
and state why it is irreparable and why the order was granted without
notice, and shall by its terms expire within such time after entry, not to
exceed ten days, as the court or judge may fix, unless within the time so
fixed the order is extended for a like period for good cause shown, and
the reasons for such extension shall be entered of record. In case a tem-
porary restraining order shall be granted without notice in the contin-
gency specified, the matter of the issuance of a preliminary injunction
shall be set down for a hearing at the earliest possible time and shall take
precedence of all matters except older matters of the same character; and
when the same comes up for hearing the party obtaining the temporary
restraining order shall proceed with the application for a preliminary
injunction, and if he does not do so the court shall dissolve the tempo-
rary restraining order. Upon two days notice to the party obtaining such
temporary restraining order the opposite party may appear and move
the dissolution or modification of the order, and in that event the court
or judge shall proceed to hear and determine the motion as expeditiously
as the ends of justice may require.
Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 17, 38 Stat. 737 (1914) (current version at FED. R. Civ. P.
65 (b)). In 1934 Congress recodified section 17 of the Clayton Act. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 381 (1934) (repealed by the Judicial Code Revision Act of 1948). Section 381
used the same language as Section 17 of the Clayton Act and effected no changes
in the duration of TROs. It appears, however, that by adopting the language of
Section 17, Congress intended to broaden the statutory authority for authorizing
and regulating TROs to include all cases in federal court, not simply those within
the purview of the Clayton Act.
27. See Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 17, 38 Stat. 737 (1914) (current version at FED. R. Civ.
P. 65(b)). A TRO must expire within ten days of its issuance unless, for good
cause, the court extends the TRO for an additional ten day period. Thus, the
maximum duration of a TRO becomes twenty days.
28. See id
29. While I was unable to find any reported cases which interpret and apply this
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pear that the introduction of a twenty day maximum duration for
TROs was established because of legislative concern for the rights of
the party being restrained and a desire to establish certain concrete,
minimal safeguards protecting those rights.30
C Rule 65(b)
In 1938 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated by
the Supreme Court. Rule 65(b) concerns TROs and, like its immediate
predecessor, limits their duration to a maximum of twenty days. 3' Un-
like prior legislation concerning TROs, however, the provisions of rule
65(b) with regard to their duration are frequently litigated in federal
courts. Recently, new concern has arisen respecting the strict interpre-
tation most federal courts have given this twenty day limitation.
III. CHARACTERISTICS OF TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDERS
A court takes several factors into consideration when deciding
whether to grant a TRO. First, the court requires the party seeking a
TRO to show that unless it is issued he will suffer some irreparable
harm or injury and that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his
claim.32 Second, a court must decide that the hardship facing the per-
son seeking the TRO outweighs any hardship the restrained party
would suffer if a TRO were issued. 33 Finally, there must be no ade-
quate legal remedy available to the moving party, and no substantial
harm to the public that can be caused by the issuance of the order.34
A party may not appeal a court's decision to grant, deny or dis-
solve a TRO because it lacks the requisite finality required for appeala-
ble orders.35 Additionally, there are two practical reasons for not
considering TROs appealable. First, TROs are only effective for brief
periods of time before they are supplanted by some type of appealable
change in the duration of TROs, there are cases which imply that section 17 of the
Clayton Act was to be strictly interpreted See, e.g., Laurence v. St. Louis - San
Francisco Ry. Co., 274 U.S. 588, 596 (1927).
30. This appears to be true because in later cases analyzing 28 U.S.C. § 381 (1934)
(repealed by the Judicial Code Revision Act of 1948) and FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b)
the courts have expressed concern as to restraining a person from acting or com-
pelling him to act without notice and an opportunity to be heard. By limiting the
circumstances in which a TRO may issue and its duration once issued, minimal
safeguards protecting the restrained party's procedural due process rights are pres-
ent. See Sims v. Greene, 160 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1947).
31. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
32. Hughes v. Cristorfane, 486 F. Supp. 541, 544 (D. Md. 1980).
33. Id
34. Id




injunction.36 Second, because TROs are generally issued ex parte, it
would be unjust to allow an appeal when the trial judge did not com-
mand sufficient time for a full presentation of the facts and law.3 7
While the standards a court uses to decide whether to grant a pre-
liminary injunction are similar to the standards used for determining
whether to issue a TRO,3 8 there are additional procedural safeguards
that must be satisfied both before and after a court grants or denies a
motion for a preliminary injunction.39 Preliminary injunctions are is-
sued only after both parties have had an opportunity to be heard.4" In
addition, any judicial order that grants or denies a preliminary injunc-
tion must be accompanied by a published opinion setting forth the
separate findings of fact and conclusions of law upon which the judge
based his decision.4' Accordingly, if a TRO, issued ex parte, becomes
an appealable preliminary injunction after twenty days, it will be
stricken as defective due to the lack of a hearing and the absence of the
required findings of fact and conclusions of law.42
For example, in National Mediation Board v. Air Line Pilots Associ-
ation International,4 3 a district court issued a TRO enjoining the Na-
tional Mediation Board from conducting a representation election
during a labor dispute between American Airlines and competing un-
ions." The district court, however, extended the TRO beyond twenty
days.45 The National Mediation Board appealed.46 The District of Co-
lumbia Circuit Court found that the TRO had become a preliminary
injunction and held that because it was not accompanied by separate
findings of fact and conclusions of law it was improperly issued.47
Since 1938, however, federal court decisions concerning the twenty day
36. Connell v. Dulien Steel Products, Inc., 240 F.2d 414, 418 (5th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 356 U.S. 968 (1958).
37. Connell, 240 F.2d at 418.
38. See, e.g., Jones v. Pacific Intermountain Express, 536 F.2d 817, 818 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976); Pratt v. Stout, 85 F.2d 172, 176-77 (8th Cir. 1936).
The appropriateness of granting or denying preliminary injunctions lies within the
sound discretion of the court and depends on the consideration and balancing of
various factors, such as the likelihood of success on the merits, lack of adequate
legal remedy, impact on the parties and the public interest, and the prospect of
irreparable harm.
39. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52, 65(a).
40. Morning Telegraph v. Powers, 450 F.2d 97, 99 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 954 (1972).
41. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a), 65(a).
42. It is interesting to note that the same is true when a TRO is not issued ex parte.
Apparently, whatever opportunity the restrained party may have had to be heard
is insufficient to satisfy the requirements of a preliminary injunction hearing.
43. 323 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
44. Id at 305.
45. 1d The TRO was issued on June 18, 1963. On June 27 the district court extended
it until July 5. On July 5, the court again extended the TRO for an additional ten
days. Id
46. Id
47. Id at 306.
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limitation on the duration of a TRO have been inconsistent. A detailed
examination of the various positions taken by the federal judiciary
follows.
IV. CONFLICT IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
In analyzing the positions taken by the various federal circuits
concerning the duration of TROs, two distinct approaches are discerni-
ble.48 One approach strictly construes rule 65(b) to require that a TRO
which extends beyond twenty days without the restrained party's con-
sent automatically becomes a preliminary injunction.49 The second ap-
proach does not construe rule 65(b)'s twenty day limitation so strictly.
Rather, it allows a TRO to extend beyond twenty days, under the
proper circumstances, without becoming a preliminary injunction. °
A. Strict Interpretation of Rule 65(b)
In Sims v. Greene5 the Third Circuit strictly interpreted rule 65(b)
and held that a TRO may not extend beyond twenty days unless the
party against whom the order is directed consents to such an exten-
sion." In Sims, a bishop sought to enjoin another bishop of the same
church from attempting to preside over the First Episcopal District. 3
An ex parte TRO was issued on December 2, 1946 and was scheduled
to expire ten days later. 4 In accordance with rule 65(b), this restraint
was extended by court order for an additional ten days. Two days
before the extended TRO was to expire, the restrained party consented
48. Some courts apparently have opted to avoid this issue. See, e.g., Consolidation
Coal Co. v. Disabled Miners of So. W. Va., 442 F.2d 1261 (4th Cir.) (on appeal
the court did not address the issue of whether a TRO may extend beyond twenty
days), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 911 (1971). For a detailed discussion of this case, see
infra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., Morning Telegraph v. Powers, 450 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1971) (TRO's have a
propensity to self-destruct in twenty days), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 954 (1972); Na-
tional Mediation Bd. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 323 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1963)
(an order extending a TRO beyond twenty days is tantamount to the grant of a
preliminary injunction); Sims v. Greene, 160 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1947) (no TRO's
may be continued beyond twenty days unless the party against whom the order is
directed consents).
50. See, e.g., Maine v. Fri, 483 F.2d 439, 441 (1st Cir. 1973) (court stated that the
district court's failure to dissolve a TRO within ten days of its issuance must be
viewed as an extension of the original order for an additional ten days beyond the
initial date of expiration. The court assumed that the trial court realized that a
TRO cannot be extended indefinitely and that the lower court intended to conduct
a hearing on the issuance of the preliminary injunction within the twenty day
period or very shortly thereafter); Connell v. Dulien Steel Products, Inc., 240 F.2d
414 (5th Cir. 1957) (TRO which remained in effect for twenty-eight days was not
an appealable preliminary injunction), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 968 (1958).
51. 160 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1947).
52. Id. at 516-17.
53. Id at 513-14.
54. Id. at 514.
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to an extension of the TRO until January 14, 1947."1 On January 13
the court again extended the TRO for a ten day period without the
restrained party's consent and began a preliminary injunction hear-
ing. 6 This third extension caused the order to extend beyond twenty
days without the consent of the restrained party. The Third Circuit
held that the TRO had become a preliminary injunction.17 Accord-
ingly, since the district court had not set out findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law as to the grounds for the issuance of the injunction, the
Third Circuit dissolved it."
Sims is significant because it was one of the first cases to interpret
rule 65(b)'s provision limiting a TRO's duration. Its rationale has been
adopted by most of the federal circuits. 59 For example, Pan American
World Airways, Inc. v. Flight Engineers International Association60 and
Connell v. Dulien Steel Products, Inc. 61 illustrate how most circuit
courts follow the rationale of Sims and strictly interpret rule 65(b). In
Pan American, a district court issued a TRO enjoining threatened
strike activity by a flight engineers' union against Pan American. 62 The
court, however, extended this TRO well beyond twenty days.63 The
flight engineers' union appealed. 64 In holding that the TRO was trans-
formed into a preliminary injunction, the Second Circuit emphasized
that merely because notice was given and a hearing held there was no
justification for allowing the TRO to extend beyond the twenty day
period prescribed by rule 65(b).65 When notice has been given and a
hearing held, the Second Circuit stated that a court may either grant or
deny the request for a preliminary injunction, but it should not extend
the TRO.66
In Connell v. Dulien Steel Products, Inc. 67 a Louisiana district court
interpreted rule 65(b)'s time limitations to apply only to TROs issued
ex parte and, therefore, concluded that any notice to the party to be
restrained should give a district court the power to extend a TRO be-
yond twenty days. 68 This interpretation was potentially significant be-
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id at 516-17.
58. Id
59. See, e.g., Morning Telegraph v. Powers, 450 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 954 (1972); Dilworth v. Riner, 343 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1965); National
Mediation Bd. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 323 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
60. 306 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1962).
61. 240 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 968 (1958).
62. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Flight Eng'rs Int'l Ass'n, 306 F.2d 840, 841 (2d
Cir. 1962).
63. Id at 842. The TRO was issued on June 22, 1961. It was extended on June 26
until July 6 and again on July 5 until August 1.
64. Id at 841.
65. Id. at 842.
66. Id
67. 240 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 968 (1958).
68. 240 F.2d at 417.
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cause of its liberal construction of rule 65(b)'s time provisions. Instead
of strictly interpreting rule 65(b) to mean that a TRO may only extend
beyond twenty days when the restrained party consents to it, the district
court's approach attempted to establish that whenever a restrained
party has received notification that a TRO is being sought, prior to its
actual issuance, the court may extend the order beyond twenty days.6 9
The Fifth Circuit, however, concluded that this reasoning was com-
pletely erroneous, and emphasized that such an interpretation would
eliminate the requirement of consent by the restrained party before an
extension beyond a second ten day period would be allowed by the
court.7" The Fifth Circuit felt that such an interpretation would require
only mere notice to the party for an extension of the TRO.7"
B. 4 Less Stringent Interpretation of Rule 65(b)
Limiting the duration of a TRO plays an important role in guaran-
teeing that no party shall be restrained from acting or be compelled to
act for an indefinite period of time without an opportunity to be heard.
There are, however, some federal courts which have recognized that
blindly adhering to rule 65(b)'s twenty day limitation may, in certain
circumstances, cause irreparable harm to a party seeking injunctive
relief.72 Thus, these federal courts have been less inclined to rigidly
apply rule 65(b)'s twenty day limitation. Legal commentators have
also been critical of such a strict interpretation of the twenty day
limitation.73
A case illustrative74 of this more flexible approach is Maine v.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id At the same time, however, the court concluded that a TRO should be trans-
formed into a preliminary injunction only when the order is continued for a sub-
stantial length of time past the period prescribed by rule 65. The court found that
8 days was not substantial in this case. Id What constitutes a substantial length
of time beyond twenty days remains unclear.
72. See, e.g., Maine v. Fri, 483 F.2d 439 (lst Cir. 1973); Connell v. Dulien Steel Prod-
ucts, Inc., 240 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 968 (1958).
73. See, e.g., 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
CIVIL § 2953, at 521 (1973) (courts should have discretion to extend a TRO be-
yond twenty days if the moving party has exercised good faith in seeking the
preliminary injunction hearing but has been unsuccessful, and if the danger of
irreparable injury continues); 7 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 65.07,
at 65-81 (Supp. 1980-8 1) (although the author agrees with the general principle of
National Mediation Bd, that indiscriminate extensions, without consent, cannot
be tolerated, there may be circumstances which warrant an additional extension
for good cause which would make the overall period exceed twenty days).
74. For additional cases see Pennsylvania Motor Truck Ass'n v. Philadelphia Marine
Terminal Ass'n, 276 F.2d 931 (3d Cir. 1960) (court refused to hear an appeal from
a TRO which provided that it would remain in force until the application for a
preliminary injunction had been heard. The court emphasized that the district
court's failure to designate a ten day limitation did not alter its essential character
so as to convert it into a preliminary injunction); Connell v. Dulien Steel Prod-
ucts, Inc., 240 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1957) (TRO which remained in effect for twenty-
[Vol. 12
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Fri.7 5 In Fri the state of Maine was attempting to force compliance
with Title II of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendment
of 1972.76 The district court issued a TRO and ordered the federal
government to allot money to the state until further order of the
court.7 7 After the district court denied a motion to vacate the order, the
federal government filed an appeal claiming that because the district
court's order was not limited to ten days and there had been a full
presentation by both sides at the dissolution hearing78 the TRO had
effectively become a preliminary injunction.79
However, the First Circuit rejected the appellant's argument, and
held that it had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal.80 The court gave
several reasons why the TRO had not been transformed into a prelimi-
nary injunction. First, there had not been a full presentation by both
parties at the dissolution hearing.8' Second, the district court had
clearly indicated that it was issuing a TRO and that a full hearing on
the issuance of a preliminary injunction would soon follow.8 2 Further-
more, the court stated that rule 65(b) explicitly limited the duration of
all TROs to ten days,83 and the district court's failure to so limit the
TRO was not significant.84 Additionally, the court declared that the
district court's refusal to dissolve the TRO should be considered an
extension of the original order for an additional ten day period.
85
While recognizing that a TRO may not extend indefinitely, the First
Circuit expressly stated that when a district court intends to conduct a
hearing on the issuance of a preliminary injunction within the twenty
day period, or very shortly thereafter, the TRO could remain as such
without being transformed. 86 The court enumerated two specific situa-
tions where a TRO may be permitted to extend beyond the twenty day
limit without becoming a preliminary injunction.87 The first situation
eight days was not converted into a preliminary injunction because it did not con-
tinue for a substantial length of time beyond twenty days), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
968 (1958).
75. 483 F.2d 439 (lst Cir. 1973).
76. Id at 441. See 33 U.S.C. § 1281 (1976 & Supp. VI 1982).
77. Fri, 483 F.2d at 440.
78. Id
79. Id Seven days after the TRO was issued a hearing was held on the appellants'
motion to vacate the restraining order. The motion was denied. Id
80. Id
81. Id at 440-41.





87. Id The court's reference to the examples where a TRO may extend beyond
twenty days without becoming a preliminary injunction is dicta. Nevertheless, it
illustrates a more flexible approach in interpreting rule 65(b)'s provisions limiting
the duration of TROs than the approach taken by the Second and Fifth Circuits.
Id at 441 n. 1. The court cites 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2953, at 521 (1973) as its authority.
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occurs when there is a continuing danger of irreparable injury and the
moving party has exercised good faith in seeking the preliminary in-
junction hearing but has nonetheless been unsuccessful.88 The second
situation occurs if the hearing on a preliminary injunction has been
held within the twenty day period, but an extension is needed until the
court reaches its decision. 9
An interesting point raised in Fri concerns the situation when a
preliminary injunction hearing is not held within twenty days of the
TRO's issuance. The First Circuit stated that in this situation a strong
argument could be advanced that the TRO had become a preliminary
injunction for the purposes of appeal.9" The court appeared to believe
that a TRO's extension beyond twenty days, without the restrained
party's consent, should be subject to judicial scrutiny on appeal. Nev-
ertheless, the court did not indicate that appeal of a TRO which ex-
tends beyond twenty days should be stricken solely because it
mechanically fails to satisfy all the requirements of a preliminary
injunction.91
An excellent example of a situation where a preliminary injunc-
tion hearing began but, due to no fault of the parties, could not be
completed within the twenty day period after a TRO had issued is Con-
solidation Coal Company v. Disabled Miners of South West Virginia. 92
In this case the Consolidated Coal Company sought and obtained a
TRO to enjoin picketing and work stoppages by disabled miners and
their dependents at certain coal mining facilities in West Virginia.93
When the district court realized that the preliminary injunction hearing
would not be completed before the TRO was scheduled to expire, it
extended the restraining order for an additional ten day period.9 4 Ten
days later, the district court judge was faced with a dilemma when he
again realized that the injunction hearing would still not be completed
before the TRO was scheduled to expire.95 The judge could not prop-
erly issue a preliminary injunction because the injunction hearing had
88. Fri, 483 F.2d at 441.
89. Id. The court cites 7 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 65.07 n.l I, at 65-
81 to -82 (1972) as its authority.
90. Fri 483 F.2d at 441; see 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2953, at 519-20 (1973).
91. For example, in Fri, separate findings of fact and conclusions of law were not
issued by the judge.
92. 442 F.2d 1261 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 911 (1971).
93. 442 F.2d at 1263.
94. Id. at 1268. The TRO was issued on August 14 and was to expire at 5:00 p.m. on
August 24. At the August 24 injunction hearing no witnesses testified because the
bench and bar conferred concerning similar labor problems in the Southern Dis-
trict of West Virginia and their bearing on the instant case. As a result, the district
judge extended the TRO for another ten days, or until September 3, and sched-
uled another injunction hearing for 1:30 p.m. on September 3. Id
95. Id at 1269. The September 3rd injunction hearing would not have been com-




not been completed. At the same time, he was aware that the propriety
of extending a TRO beyond twenty days without the restrained party's
consent was questionable. In an attempt to resolve this dilemma, the
judge extended the TRO for another ten day period to allow the in-
junction hearing to be completed, and at the same time issued a prelim-
inary injunction similar in scope to an injunction that another district
court had granted in related litigation.96 The decision granting this in-
junction was appealed. The Fourth Circuit ruled that the injunction
was invalid because the necessary findings of fact and conclusions of
law were absent.97 Significantly, however, the court disposed of the
case without dealing with the district court's extension of the TRO be-
yond twenty days.98 This was because the court felt that the prelimi-
nary injunction had superseded the restraining order, thereby making
the validity of its extension moot. While the Fourth Circuit was correct
in stating that it was not necessary to address the propriety of extending
the TRO beyond twenty days in order to decide the case, it also recog-
nized the dilemma faced by the district court judge. Unfortunately,
however, the Fourth Circuit chose not to offer any guidance as to
whether a TRO may, when an injunction hearing has begun but cannot
be completed within the twenty day period, extend beyond twenty days
without becoming a preliminary injunction.
C. The Supreme Court's Decisions
In 1974 the Supreme Court decided two cases dealing with the
twenty day limitation upon a TRO's duration prescribed by rule
65(b).99 Neither of these decisions, however, holds that a TRO may
never extend beyond twenty days without being considered a prelimi-
nary injunction. As a result, the conflicting decisions among the fed-
eral circuits on this issue remain unresolved.
In Sampson v. Murray, "o Murray was scheduled to be discharged
from her position as a probationary government employee on May 29,
1971. Ol Prior to that date Murray filed an action claiming that certain
civil service regulations were not followed with regard to her termina-
tion.'0 2 Accordingly, she sought a TRO enjoining her employer from
dismissing her pending an administrative appeal. The district court
granted Murray's request and issued the TRO, scheduling a hearing on
her application for a temporary injunction for the following week.1"3




99. Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61 (1974); Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Teamsters,
415 U.S. 423 (1974).
100. 415 U.S. 61 (1974).
101. Id at 62-63.
102. Id
103. Id at 66.
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the injunction hearing causing the court to extend the TRO beyond
twenty days. 104 The government, claiming the TRO had become a pre-
liminary injunction, appealed the district court's ruling. The Supreme
Court agreed with the District of Columbia circuit court's interpreta-
tion that the extension of the TRO beyond twenty days required it to be
treated as a preliminary injunction."0 5 Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the Court, emphasized that a district court should not be able to shield
its orders from appellate review simply by designating them as
TROs.106 The Court reasoned that to hold otherwise would allow a
district court virtually unlimited authority over the parties in an injunc-
tive proceeding. 0'
In Sampson, the Supreme Court neither discussed nor indicated
what type of situation might warrant an extension of a TRO beyond
twenty days. Nevertheless, by limiting its holding to the facts of the
case, 0 8 the Court seemed to imply that there were circumstances when
extension of a TRO would be proper, necessary, and not result in its
transformation into a preliminary injunction.
In Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local
No. 70, 'o a local teamsters union, its officers and agents struck in vio-
lation of collective bargaining agreements." t0 Granny Goose filed a
complaint in state court seeking injunctive relief. A TRO enjoining all
strike activity was issued,"' but the union removed the case to federal
district court " 2 before the preliminary injunction hearing was held.' 13
104. Id at 66-67.
105. Sampson, 415 U.S. at 86-88. The District of Columbia circuit court held that a
TRO continuing beyond twenty days must be treated as a preliminary injunction,
and must conform to the standards applicable to preliminary injunctions. This
means that there must have been a hearing and separate findings of fact and con-
clusions of law issued; see also Murray v. Kunzig, 462 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
106. Sampson, 415 U.S. at 86. The label given an order by a court is not determinative
as to whether the order is a TRO or preliminary injunction. A reviewing court
will look at the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the order to determine
whether a TRO or preliminary injunction actually issued. Two factors to be con-
sidered are whether there was a hearing and whether a TRO lasted more than
twenty days. Id
107. Id at 87.
108. Though the Court adhered to general principles imposing strict limitations on the
scope of TROs, it limited its holding to the specific circumstances of the case.
Referring to the court of appeals' decision that a TRO continuing beyond twenty
days becomes a preliminary injunction, the Court stated: "We believe that this
analysis is correct, at least in the type of situation presented here, and comports with
general principles imposing strict limitations on the scope of temporary re-
straining orders." Id at 86 (emphasis added).
109. 415 U.S. 423 (1974).
110. Id. at 427.
111. Id at 428. The TRO was issued by the Superior Court of California on May 15,
1970. Id
112. Id The union and the individual defendants removed the proceeding to the fed-
eral district court for the District of Northern California on the ground that the
action arose under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. Id Since
the action arose under a law of the United States, removal from state to federal
court was proper; see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1976).
113. Granny Goose, 415 U.S. at 428.
Temporary Restraining Orders
The district court denied a motion by the union to dissolve the TRO
and after five months of relative tranquility, the labor dispute re-
sumed. "4 Thereafter, acting upon a motion by Granny Goose, the dis-
trict court found the union to be in criminal contempt for violating the
TRO's ban on all strike activity.' 'I Under the United States Code, any
injunction or other order issued in a state court prior to removal re-
mains in full force and effect until dissolved or modified by a federal
district court." 6 The district court reasoned that the TRO was still in
effect because a federal court never dissolved or modified the order.' 'l
The union argued that under rule 65(b) a TRO could not extend be-
yond twenty days without the consent of the party being restrained."'
Therefore, rule 65(b)'s twenty day limitation upon the duration of a
TRO was in direct conflict with section 1450 of the code.
The Ninth Circuit's reversal of the contempt finding against the
union" 9 was affirmed by the Supreme Court, which emphasized that
section 1450 was not designed to give injunctions greater effect after
removal to federal court than they would have had if the case had re-
mained in state court.' 20 Moreover, the Court held that the union had
a right to be protected by rule 65(b)'s time limitation once the case was
removed.' 2' Reflecting on the purpose and nature of TROs, Justice
Marshall stated:
The stringent restrictions imposed by § 17, 22 and now by
Rule 65, on the availability of exparte temporary restraining
orders reflect the fact that our entire jurisprudence runs
counter to the notion of court action taken before reasonable
notice and an opportunity to be heard have been granted both
sides of a dispute. Exparte temporary restraining orders are
no doubt necessary in certain circumstances, but under fed-
eral law they should be restricted to serving their underlying
purpose of preserving the status quo and preventing irrepara-
114. Id
115. Id at 425-26.
116. See 28 U.S.C. § 1450 (1976). That section provides in part: "Whenever any ac-
tion is removed from a state court to a district court of the United States. . .[a~ll
injunctions, orders and other proceedings had in such action prior to its removal
shall remain in full force and effect until dissolved or modified by the district
court." Id
117. Granny Goose, 415 U.S. at 430.
118. Id
119. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's contempt finding on the ground
that the TRO had expired before November 30, 1970, the day of the alleged con-
tempt. Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Teamsters, 472 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1973),
afl'd, 415 U.S. 423 (1974).
120. 415 U.S. at 436.
121. Id at 438. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern the mode of proceedings
in federal court after removal from state court. See FED. R. Civ. P. 81(c).
122. This refers to Section 17 of the Clayton Act. See supra note 26.
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ble harm just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and no
longer. 123
In an attempt to establish a rule of law to accomodate the conflict-
ing policies of section 1450 and rfle 65(b), 124 the Court concluded that
a TRO issued by a state court, prior to removal, may remain in effect
no longer than it would have stayed in effect under state law. 125 The
Court stipulated, however, that under these circumstances a TRO may
not remain in effect for longer than the twenty day limit imposed by
rule 65(b), as measured from the date of removal. 126
Another issue raised on appeal was whether the district court's rul-
ing on the union's motion to dissolve the TRO could be considered a
hearing on a preliminary injunction, thereby causing the district court's
denial of the motion to become a grant of a preliminary injunction.127
The Supreme Court found this not to be so.' 28 The rationale of the
Court was primarily based on the fact that neither the parties nor the
district court treated the dissolution hearing as one for a preliminary
injunction. 129 The Court rejected the argument that the controlling
factor should be whether the restrained party had an opportunity to be
heard on the merits of the preliminary injunction when it moved to
dissolve the TRO.130 In an attempt to clarify the procedure to be fol-
lowed when a hearing on a preliminary injunction is held after a TRO
has been issued, Justice Marshall stated that a preliminary injunction,
if appropriate, should be issued at the hearing accompanied by the
necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law.'31 Mere continuation
of the TRO, however, would not be sufficient. 3 2 The Court reempha-
123. Granny Gose, 415 U.S. at 438-39 (citations omitted).
124. The policy underlying section 1450 is that no lapse in a state court's temporary
restraining order will occur simply by removing a case to federal court. Id at 439.
The policy underlying rule 65(b) is to strictly limit and control the circumstances
deemed appropriate for TRO's. Id
125. Id. at 439-40.
126. Id. In the instant case the amended TRO was issued on May 18, 1970. and would
have remained in effect no longer than fifteen days under California law, or until
June 2, 1970. The case was removed to federal court on May 20, 1970. The TRO
therefore expired on May 30, 1970 by applying the ten day limitation of rule 65(b)
from the date of removal. Thus, no order was in effect on November 30, 1970,
when the union was alleged to be in contempt. Id at 440.
127. Id
128. Id at 441-42. The Court noted that there were situations when the parties would
not intend to present their cases for or against a preliminary injunction at a hear-
ing on a motion to dissolve a TRO. In such circumstances the appropriate proce-
dure would be for the district court to address the issues raised in the motion to
dissolve or modify the restraining order but to postpone for a later hearing, to be
held within rule 65(b)'s time limitations, the application for a preliminary
injunction.
129. Id. at 442.
130. Id




sized that when a court decides to supplant a TRO with a preliminary
injunction, it should issue an order specifically stating its intention.' 33
If the court fails to do so, the party against whom the TRO is issued
should be able to reasonably assume that the TRO expired within the
time limits imposed by rule 65(b). ' 34 Although technically dicta, these
statements are quite significant. They may be interpreted to mean that
a TRO expires after a maximum of twenty days, unless a court pro-
vides otherwise. Thus, if a court specifically states that a TRO is to
remain in effect until an injunction hearing is completed or until fur-
ther order of the court, there exists a possibility that the TRO may ex-
tend beyond twenty days.
In short, the Supreme Court made it clear in Sampson and Granny
Goose that TROs may not be of an indefinite nature. Nevertheless, the
Court did not squarely address the question of whether a TRO may last
beyond twenty days in the proper set of circumstances. Therefore, the
Supreme Court has not resolved the conflict among the circuit courts.
V. ANALYSIS
Federal circuit courts disagree as to whether a TRO extending be-
yond twenty days, without the restrained party's consent, remains a
TRO or is transformed into a preliminary injunction. 35 Moreover, no
definitive stand has been taken by the Supreme Court on this issue.
While all of the circuits agree that a TRO may not be extended
indefinitely, strong arguments have been made advocating that in the
proper circumstances a TRO should be allowed to extend beyond
twenty days without becoming an invalid preliminary injunction. Such
arguments are deserving of careful attention and study as the conflict-
ing interests and rights of the party being restrained and the party seek-
ing the TRO must be balanced. In attempting to strike this balance, a
difficult task indeed, it is important to remember that TROs were
designed as a remedial means of preserving the status quo of the liti-
gants and preventing irreparable harm just so long as necessary. 136
Before the introduction of a definite time limitation in 1917, the
Supreme Court concluded that "just so long as was necessary" was un-
til such time as a court decided to grant or deny the motion for a pre-
liminary injunction. 137 Rule 65(b) attempts to strike this balance, and
has done so quite effectively.
However, if a court issues a TRO and begins a preliminary injunc-
tion hearing within twenty days but cannot complete the hearing within
this period, it should be able to extend the order until the hearing has
been completed and the injunction has been granted or denied. This
133. Id at 444-45.
134. Id at 445.
135. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
136. Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 438-39 (1974).
137. Houghton v. Meyer, 208 U.S. 149, 156 (1908).
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protects the party seeking the TRO from being placed in a position of
suffering an irreparable injury because of an unreasonable interpreta-
tion of rule 65(b)'s time provisions. It also assures the restrained party
that an injunction hearing will be completed as soon as possible, and
that this hearing will begin within twenty days of the issuance of the
TRO. This approach, in these circumstances, appears to be more ra-
tional than striking the order as an improperly issued preliminary in-
junction. It balances the rights and interests of both parties and arrives
at a just solution.
A more difficult situation exists when the party seeking a TRO has
made every possible attempt to have a preliminary injunction hearing
begun within twenty days, but for reasons beyond his control has been
unsuccessful. Keeping in mind a TRO's basic purpose - to preserve
the status quo until an injunction hearing can be held - the most ra-
tional approach appears to be to allow the court to extend the TRO
until the preliminary injunction hearing has been completed, so long as
the court acts reasonably. This, of course, may be accomplished by
making any TRO extending beyond twenty days appealable and sub-
ject to judicial review. That review, however, should judge the TRO by
TRO standards rather than preliminary injunction standards.
VI. CONCLUSION
Most federal courts have strictly interpreted the provisions of rule
65(b). According to this view, a TRO that extends beyond twenty days
without the consent of the restrained party is transformed into a pre-
liminary injunction. However, since the TRO does not meet the mini-
mum standards required of preliminary injunctions, the order is
improperly issued and must therefore be stricken. Some circuit courts,
on the other hand, have recognized that to blindly adhere to such an
interpretation in certain cases may result in inequitable and harsh con-
sequences. Accordingly, these courts take the position that in certain
circumstances a district court should be allowed to extend a TRO be-
yond twenty days without the TRO being transformed into a prelimi-
nary injunction. The Supreme Court, while clearly stating that a TRO
may not extend indefinitely, has failed to settle the conffict among the
circuits on this issue.
It is the opinion of this writer that when an injunction hearing has
begun within the twenty day period prescribed by rule 65(b), a district
court judge should be allowed to extend the TRO until the hearing has
been completed and the judge has granted or denied the request. Like-
wise, if the party seeking a TRO has done everything possible to have
an injunction hearing begun within twenty days, but due to no fault of
his own has been unsuccessful, a district court judge should be able to
extend the TRO until the injunction hearing can be completed. Ex-
tending a TRO in such circumstances appears to be the best means of
preserving the underlying purpose behind TROs: to maintain the sta-
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19831 Temporary Restraining Orders 293
tus quo and prevent irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to
hold a hearing.
Joseph M Furey
